Sales—Transfer of Title—Federal Retailers\u27 Excise Tax.—Around The World Shoppers Club v. United States by Carroll, David W
Boston College Law Review
Volume 3 | Issue 3 Article 25
4-1-1962
Sales—Transfer of Title—Federal Retailers' Excise
Tax.—Around The World Shoppers Club v. United
States
David W. Carroll
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Commercial Law Commons, Securities Law Commons, and the Tax Law Commons
This Casenotes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
David W. Carroll, Sales—Transfer of Title—Federal Retailers' Excise Tax.—Around The World Shoppers
Club v. United States, 3 B.C.L. Rev. 558 (1962), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol3/iss3/25
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
Here, although this court has reviewed rate determinations de novo
when the charge of confiscation is made,'s it does not appear that the court
did in fact in this instance review de novo. It must be admitted that it was
perhaps close to de novo review," ) for the plaintiffs had the burden of
proof.2° But even by a rigid substantial evidence test the allocation could
not stand. Because the commissioner's duties were outined,21 the court found
it easy to say: "we have mentioned that there is no finding that the rate
base . . . which the commissioner's order shifts from intrastate to interstate
. . . are not employed and incurred in the operation of the intrastate plant."22
De novo review is not to be condemned merely because the Supreme Court
now provides for Iess review, for although perhaps not constitutionally
necessary, there is nothing to restrict a state from providing de novo review
or substituting its independent judgment.23
JOSEPH L. COTTER
Sales—Transfer of Title—Federal Retailers' Excise Tax.—Around The
World Shoppers Club v. United States.' —Around The World Shoppers
Club (Club) was an enterprise to which persons subscribed to receive
"gifts" which were shipped directly to them from a different foreign country
for each month of their subscription. To join, the persons submitted to the
Club an application for membership and payment in advance for the "gifts."
Upon acceptance of the application, the Club sent a label bearing the mem-
ber's name and address to foreign suppliers which had agreed with the Club
to ship "gifts" to its members. The Club handled all communications both
with its members and with the foreign suppliers. The suppliers were re-
sponsible only to the Club for adjustment of any claims against them and
received payment for the "gifts" from the Club. The Club brought suit to
recover a part payment made under a Federal Retailers' Excise Tax2 assess-
ment on the value of the "gifts" which had been sent to its members. The
U.S. District Court, in granting a government counterclaim for the unpaid
18 Supra note 6.
19 Supra note 1, at 1032, "So that we will not be misunderstood we add that the
evidence affords no basis for determining the value of a call or of saying that an inter-
state call has any greater value than an intrastate call."
29 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 757.585 (1959). But see supra note 1, at 1025, "The company's
witness established at least primit facie that the part of the plant represented by the sum
of $6,194,114 was devoted to intrastate service . ." (emphasis added).
21 Ore. Rev. Stat. § 757.055 (1959), "The Commissioner shall value all the property
of every public utility used or useful for the convenience of the public ... ," Ore. Rev.
Stat. § 756.550(3) (1959), "After the completion of the taking of evidence and within a
reasonable time the commissioner shall prepare and enter findings of fact and conclusions
of Iaw upon all the evidence received in the matter and shall make and enter his order
thereon. . . ."
22 Supra note 1, at 1036.
23 See Opinion of the Justices, supra note 15.
1 198 F. Supp. 773 (D.N.J. 1961).
2 68A Stat. 473 (1954), 26 U.S.C. §§ 4001-057 (1958).
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balance of tax, HELD: The transactions between the Club and its members
on the one hand, and between the Club and the suppliers on the other, in-
volve two sales of the goods. Accordingly, title to the goods passed from the
suppliers through the Club to the members; the Club being in effect a re-
tailer. Under the Uniform Sales Acts of New Jersey, where the Club is located,
title to the goods passed when they were delivered to the members within
the United States. Thus, the second sale was subject to the Federal Re-
tailers' Excise Tax.
In the instant case, the Club resisted the tax on two grounds. First, that
it never took title to the goods which were shipped directly by the foreign
suppliers to members in this country, and secondly, that the tax, which was
imposed upon sales .' made within the United States, was not applicable in
this situation since title to the goods here involved passed to the members
when the goods were mailed in the foreign country. Quaere: Upon what
theory did the Club initially determine that •it was not required to collect
and pay the tax? 6
The facts of this case can easily be construed to fit a number of capaci-
ties in which the Club may be deemed to have operated. The Club may be
viewed as an agent for many prinicipals, its members, who employ the Club
to deal with foreign suppliers in procuring goods to be sent to the member-
principals. As such, the Club, if it had title at all, 6 would be taking it in the
8 N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 46:30-1, 7(1), 23, 25, rule 5 (1937). Although this statute is
entitled the Uniform Sale of Goods Law in New Jersey, its provisions are substantially
identical with the provisions of the Uniform Sales Act (hereinafter cited as U.S.A:).
4 Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570 (1931), where the Court, in
adhering to the principle that the instrumentalities, means and operations whereby states
exercise their functions of government are exempt from taxation by the United States,
refused to sanction the addition of excise taxes to the cost of a motorcycle which was
sold to a municipal corporation of a state because the tax "is laid on the sale, and on
that alone" (Id. at 574).
5 Although the retailer is primarily liable for the tax, it would seem the Club must
have had good cause to believe it was not acting as a retailer, for this type of assess-
ment is usually passed on to the consumer. The tax regulations forbid disguising this
impost as part of the sales price. However, in the usual case, the assessment is itemized
as an addition to the sales price, and thus validly passed to, and assumed by, the con-
sumer. Hence, even if the Club had thought it was accountable for the levy, no financial
detriment would have resulted to the Club itself.
In examining the fact situation of the principal case it appears that a loose analogy
may be drawn between it and cases which involve a state's endeavor to make a foreign
corporation its agent and insurer for the collection of domestic sales taxes. The issues
in the latter cases usually revolve around the questions of whether the foreign corpora-
tions are sufficiently present within the taxing state so that such an agency may be
constitutionally imposed upon them, and/or whether the sale took place within the
taxing state. McGoldrick v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940);
McGoldrick v. Felt, 309 U.S. 70 (1940); Compagnie Generale Transatlantique v. Mc-
Goldrick, 309 U.S. 430 (1938); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. State Commissioner, 156
Kan. 408, 133 P.2d 1008 (1943). In the instant case there was no problem of diversity,
for it was a federal tax on a New Jersey concern. However, the problem of where the
sale actually took place was in issue.
6 For a consideration of this point see Justice Livingston's opinion in King &
Boozer v. State, 241 Ala. 557, 3 So. 2d 572 (1941), cert. granted, 314 U.S. 599 (1941),
rev'd, 314 U.S. 1 (1941).
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capacity of agent for its member-principal. To apply a retailers' tax to such
an arrangement is, at best, difficult. In effect, the foreign supplier would be
the retailer, 7 and since it is located outside the jurisdiction of the United
States it could not be liable for a United States retailers' tax. The fact that
the Club itself is bound to pay the foreign supplier is consistent with agency
principles.s It is true that the scope of the agent's authority would be ex-
tremely broad, but this too is consistent with agency concepts.°
The second theory under which the principal case may be explained
differs only slightly from the first. This would be a broker-principal relation-
ship. A broker operates much as an agent does, but usually with more
limited powers.'° Even though strict adherence to the general rule that a
broker has no authority to contract in his own name" would preclude treat-
ing the Club as a broker, one might argue that from the very essence of
the Club's nature and activities in soliciting many members from the gen-
eral public an implied authority to contract in its own name necessarily re-
sulted.' 2 Under this theory also, the Club, if it did acquire title," would
have it in the capacity of broker for the members and thus could not be
subject to a retailers' tax.
Although the court did take nate of the fact that the foreign suppliers
assumed the risk for the goods while in transit, this is not of controlling
significance. While risk usually follows title," title does not necessarily fol-
low risk." Thus, transition of title from the foreign supplier to the Club
members at the instant of delivery to the post office would not conclusively
preclude the foreign supplier's assumption of risk for the goods to their
destination. Hence, it is difficult to see how this fact would affect the con-
tentions of either party.
It seems, however, that the most plausible position is that which was
accepted and adopted by the court in the principal case. When the Club
7 See Roland Electric Co. v. Walling, 326 U.S. 657 (1946), which considers at
length the distinctions between "wholesale" and "retail"
8 Accord, Benton v. Campbell, Parker & Co., (1925] 2 K.B. 410.
9 McNulty v. Dean, 154 Wash. 110, 281 Pac. 9 (1929).
141 Lawrence Gas Co. v. Hawkeye Oil Co., 182 Iowa 179, 165 N.W. 445 (1917);
J. M. Robinson & Co. v. Corsicana Cotton Factory, 124 Ky. 435, 99 S.W. 305 (1907);
French v. Toledo, 81 Ohio St. 190, 90 N.E. 160 (1909). See generally 8 Am. Jur. Brokers
§ 2 (1937), and cases cited therein.
11 Haas v. Ruston, 14 Ind. App. 8, 42 N.E. 298 (1895), where a broker who was
employed to negotiate a sale of flour made a contract for its sale in his own name. Since
he had acted in this manner without the knowledge or consent of his principal, the
court held he could not recover from the principal the damages paid by him to the
buyer upon his failure to perform under the contract.
12 Restatement (Second), Agency § 34 (1958): "An authorization is interpreted
in the light of all accompanying circumstances, including among other matters:
(a) the situation of the parties, their relation to one another, and the business
in which they are engaged . .. ."
13 Supra note 6.
14 I Uniform Laws Ann. § 22 (1950); Uniform Commercial Code § 2-401(2) (here-
inafter cited as UCC); 2 Williston, Sales 302 (rev. ed. 1948).
3 5
 Ibid.
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accepted an application for membership, a contract for the sale of future
goods's arose with the Club as seller, and the applicant was buyer. Since
the member was to receive a gift each month for the period of his sub-
scription, it appears title to the goods would not pass, and performance of
the contract would not be complete until the goods were delivered. This
conclusion would be inescapable under either the common law or the Uni-
form Sales Act. 17 The agreements with the foreign suppliers are the means
through which the Club effectuates compliance with its obligations to the
Club members. The legal effect of these agreements, as the court held, is that
of a purchase contract by the Club. The transactions between the Club and
its members are contracts of sale of future goods's which become retail
sales upon delivery to the members, and thus, subject to the Federal Re-.
tailers' Excise Tax.
It is significant to note that, once the facts are so construed, a similar
result would have been reached had the Uniform Commercial Code been
applicable. 19
DAVID W. CARROLL
Securities—Liability of an Insider and His Investment Partnership for
Profits Realized on a Short Swing Transaction—Section 16(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.—Blau v. Lehman. 1—Petitioner Blau,
a stockholder in Tidewater Associated Oil Company, brought an action on
behalf of his corporation to recover "short swing" profits from the respond-
ents under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.2 The
respondents were Lehman Brothers, a partnership engaged in investment
banking and the brokering and trading of securities, and Joseph A. Thomas,
a member of Lehman Brothers and a director of Tidewater. The evidence
showed that Lehman Brothers had earned profits out of short swing trans-
actions in Tidewater securities while Thomas was a director. As to charges
of deputization and wrongful use of "inside" information by Lehman
Brothers, the evidence was in conflict. There was testimony that Thomas
18 N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 46:30-1, 11(1) (1937).
17 U.S.A. § 19 is declaratory of the common law on this point. Cassinelli v. Humphrey
Supply Co., 43 Nev. 208, 183 Pac. 523 (1919) ; 2 Williston, op. cit. supra note 14, at
§ 279a. If a contrary intent were not manifested, certain guides were established for
ascertaining intent. As codified by the U.S.A. one rule stated: "If a contract to sell
requires the seller to deliver the goods to the buyer . . . the property does not pass until
the goods have been delivered. ..." 1 Uniform Laws Ann. § 19, rule 5.
18 Supra note 16.
19 UGC	 2-401(2): "Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer
at the time and place at which the seller completes his performance with reference to
the physical delivery of the goods . . . (b) if the contract requires delivery at destina-
tion, title passes on tender there." New Jersey has adopted the Uniform Commercial
Code; it is effective January 1, 1963. N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 12A:1-101 to 12A:10-106 (1961).
1 82 S. Ct. 451 (1962).
2 48 Stat. 896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1958).
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